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Abstract
We use an early episode of negotiations between Switzerland and the European
Union to investigate the value of banking secrecy for four Swiss banks: two universal
banks and two private banks. We ﬁnd that the value of banking secrecy to private
banks is large, accounting for at least 8 to 14% of their market value. Perhaps
surprisingly, banking secrecy appears to account for only a very small fraction of the
market value of the universal banks.
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How Much is Banking Secrecy Worth? The Case of
Swiss Banks
1 Introduction
Switzerland's banking secrecy laws have been credited with helping the country become
the world's largest oﬀshore private banking center, with an estimated one third of the
world's oﬀshore private wealth. Yet, on Friday, March 13, 2009, in an ultimately success-
ful attempt to avoid being placed on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development's (OECD) so-called black list, Switzerland agreed to abandon its long-held
distinction between tax fraud and tax evasion.1 Such distinction, between fraud that in-
volves the use of forged or falsiﬁed documents for the purpose of evading tax and evasion
that involves the omissioneven voluntaryto declare assets or revenues to the relevant
tax authorities had long been considered a central component of banking secrecy: only in
the former case would banking secrecy be lifted and account information communicated
to inquiring tax authorities. Numerous observers predicted that it would be only a matter
of time before banking secrecy itself would go, to be replaced by the automatic exchange
of information between tax authorities. Governments such as those of France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and the United States variously pledged to keep up the pressure on
countries with banking secrecy until such time as these countries would abandon secrecy
altogether.
In response, the Swiss Government has been adamant that banking secrecy is not
negotiable. Such statement may or may not be credible, but it would be surprising
if banking secrecy were to go, if indeed it were, without long and arduous negotiations,
perhaps even ﬁnancial and trade sanctions and counter-sanctions, the former an explicitly
threatened consequence of the black list. Some foretaste the tone such negotiations may
be provided by a number of statements made in late 2008 and early 2009: then German
Finance Minister Peer Steinbrück talked of cracking the whip on Switzerland, German
Social Democratic Party Chairman Franz Müntefering remarked that in the old times
one would have sent in the troops; conversely, Swiss parliamentarian Thomas Müller said
that Mr Steinbrück reminds him of the old generation of Germans, who sixty years ago
went through the streets with leather coats, boots, and armbands.
1Switzerland instead was placed on the grey list, from which it was removed in late 2009, having
met the requirement that it sign twelve OECD-compatible tax conventions.
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One could go on. The main point is that both pro- and anti-banking secrecy countries
must deem banking secrecy extremely important for them to have shown themselves so
clearly determined to cross swords over it, the former to keep it, the latter to have the
former do away with it. How important is banking secrecy? How much is it worth? The
latter is the question we ask in the present paper, and for which we provide a partial
answer, one that estimates the value of banking secrecy for four listed Swiss banks. For
that purpose, we use the opportunity provided by a prior round of negotiations over
banking secrecy between Switzerland and the European Union. We do not use present
developments because these are heavily contaminated by the ongoing ﬁnancial crisis, which
likely prompted them in the ﬁrst place.
Starting in 1998, the European Union (EU) put pressure on Switzerland to agree to
exchanging information regarding bank accounts held by EU residents in Switzerland,
i.e., abolish banking secrecy altogether. During negotiations that took place between
June 2002 and June 2003, Switzerland was successful in preserving banking secrecy, but
agreed to introduce a withholding tax of up to 35% on interest income earned by EU
residents. Three fourths of the proceeds from this tax are paid to EU countries.
We use an event study methodology to measure the impact of the negotiations on the
share prices of four Swiss banks: UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CSG), Bank Julius Baer
(Baer), and Bank Vontobel. At any point in time, the market value of a bank can be
viewed as the value of the bank in the absence of banking secrecy, plus the value of banking
secrecy to the bank weighted by the perceived probability that banking secrecy will be
preserved. A bank's share price reacts to a given announcement to the extent that any of
these three components of bank value are aﬀected by the announcement.
We conduct an event-by-event analysis of 34 events that occurred over the period De-
cember 1998 to June 2003, between the decision by the EU to start exploratory discussions
with Switzerland and the signature of the agreement between the two parties. We ﬁnd
contrasting results for the universal banks (UBS and CSG) and the private banks (Baer
and Vontobel). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd the value of banking secrecy to be at least 8.3% of
the value of the equity of Baer, and 13.6% of that of Vontobel. In contrast, we ﬁnd that
banking secrecy has little to no value to UBS and CSG. These numbers correspond to the
movements in the share prices of the four banks in response to two consecutive events: the
initial failure by the EU Council of Ministers to approve the treaty agreed to the previous
day by Switzerland and the EU Commission, and the ﬁnal approval of the agreement
three months later. The private banks' shares fall sharply with the ﬁrst event, and rise by
essentially the same percentage with the second. In contrast, the universal banks' shares
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remain largely unaﬀected.
We ﬁnd no overall impact of the negotiations on the share prices of the four banks.
Two explanations are possible. One is statistical: the standard error of 34 abnormal
returns cumulated may be so large as to preclude any ﬁnding of statistical signiﬁcance.
The other is economic: investors may have expected the proﬁtability of Swiss banks not
to be aﬀected by the imposition of the withholding tax, perhaps because they considered
the tax easy to avoid. Supporting the latter explanation are the relatively small amounts
withheld under the new arrangement; these have been such as to prompt the European
Commission recently to make a number of proposals to close the loopholes it deems make
the tax easy to circumvent.
An obvious question regards the applicability of our results to present circumstances.
We discuss this issue in the Conclusion, but note at this stage that the aforementioned
abandonment of the distinction between tax fraud and tax evasion suggests that the
absence of reaction may no longer be justiﬁed.
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the ﬁrst paper that uses event study method-
ology to assess the importance of banking secrecy. Event studies have a long history
in economics, ﬁnance, and the law. Schwert (1981) discusses the use of event studies
to measure the eﬀects of regulation. He surveys a wide variety of applications, cover-
ing the regulation of such diverse industries as electricity, commercial and investment
banking, and pharmaceuticals. Schipper and Thompson (1983) examine the impact of
merger-related regulations adopted in the late 1960s; Ryngaert and Netter (1988) that of
the 1986 Ohio Antitakeover Law. Loderer (1985) examines the eﬀects of Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries's minimum price and production quota decisions on oil
prices; Bittlingmayer and Hazlett (2000) those of federal antitrust enforcement actions
against Microsoft. Our paper is in the line of such research. A number of papers extend
the estimation from that of abnormal returns to obtain a monetary value for the eﬀects
of the events considered. Cutler and Summers (1988) and Engelmann and Cornell (1988)
examine the eﬀects of litigation. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Mitchell and Maloney
(1989) examine the eﬀects of product recalls and air crashes, respectively. Dial and Mur-
phy (1995) and Dittmann, Maug, and Schneider (2004) follow General Dynamics and
Preussag, respectively, through extensive restructuring and refocusing. We follow these
papers in using abnormal returns to obtain a measure of the value of banking secrecy to
Swiss banks.
Perhaps most closely related to our paper are a series of papers that have examined
the eﬀect of political events on stock prices. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Guidolin
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and La Ferrara (2006), and DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2007) examine the eﬀect of armed
conﬂict; Roberts (1990), Fisman (2001), and Johnson and Mitton (2003) that of political
connections; and Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007) that of election outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a very short history of banking
secrecy in Switzerland. Section 3 summarizes the negotiations on banking secrecy between
Switzerland and the EU and describes the events considered in the study. Section 4
presents the data and some summary statistics. Section 5 obtains a lower bound for the
value of banking secrecy. Section 6 concludes.
2 Banking Secrecy in Switzerland
Although banking secrecy formally was introduced into Swiss Law some eighty years
ago, banking secrecy has in eﬀect existed for much longer, probably going back to the
early modern era (Bergier, 1984). Banking secrecy became an issue already in the early
1920s when, in a situation that bears a number of similarities with the present situation,
Switzerland at the League of Nations came under strong pressure from France and Belgium
to abandon banking secrecy (Farquet, 2009). These two countries were concerned with
tax evasion by German citizens: the Versailles Treaty had imposed heavy reparation
payments on Germany; Germany argued it could not make such payments because of
tax evasion by its citizens; it blamed Switzerland for making such evasion possible. In
pressing need of funds and determined to get the reparation payments they were due,
France and Belgium pressured Switzerland to agree to information exchange; unable to
convince the United Kingdom to join them in putting pressure to bear on Switzerland,
France and Belgium eventually relented.
Some ten years later, following attempts by France to obtain information about deposits
held in Switzerland by French nationals, Switzerland formally introduced banking secrecy
into Swiss Law: violations were punished by ﬁnes and imprisonment. The stated aim
of the Law was to protect the privacy of bank depositors; a diplomatic dispatch from
that period reveals that the Swiss Government was mindful of the important business
conducted by Swiss banks in foreign deposits (Besson, 2004, pp. 24 and 26-27). Three
quarters of a century later, at the time of writing, Swiss Law punishes violations of banking
secrecy with ﬁnes of up to 250,000 Swiss Francs and up to three years imprisonment.2
During the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, Switzerland introduced a number of exceptions to
2At the time of writing, one Swiss Franc is worth about ¿0.67 and $1.
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banking secrecy, for funds originating from tax fraud, insider trading, money laundering,
and other activities considered criminal under Swiss Law. However, as Swiss Law con-
tinued to distinguish between tax fraud (a crime) and tax evasion (not a crime), banking
secrecy remained for funds originating from tax evasion. Thus, there were during the
period of study (1998-2003) two primary reasons for wishing to take advantage of Swiss
banking secrecy: genuine privacy concerns and tax evasion.
Banking secrecy is widely believed to have been a source of rents for Swiss banks. It
has aﬀorded them the opportunity to charge higher-than-average fees (Besson, 2004, p.
64) and to pay lower-than-average deposit rates (English and Shahin, 1994).
3 Negotiations on Banking Secrecy Between Switzer-
land and the European Union
While the EU has never looked too kindly on Swiss banking secrecy, pressure on Switzer-
land to relax banking secrecy increased strongly after December 1, 1998. On that day,
EU Finance Ministers agreed on a common framework for the taxation of savings interest,
consisting in a combination of withholding tax and information exchange between the tax
authorities of EU countries. Recognizing that these measures might cause a sizeable out-
ﬂow of funds away from EU countries, the ministers instructed the European Commission
and the so-called Troika to start exploratory discussions with third countries, especially
Switzerland, to induce them to adopt similar measures.3 An exploratory meeting between
the EU and Swiss authorities took place on March 2, 1999. On June 9, 2000, EU Com-
missioner Frits Bolkestein, in charge of the issue for the EU, met Swiss Finance Minister
Kaspar Villiger in Bern to discuss the taxation of savings interest.
Pressure increased once again after June 20, 2000. On that day, at an EU Council
held at Feira (Portugal), EU Finance Ministers agreed to exchange information on savings
income with other EU countries, i.e., to report interest income earned by a citizen residing
in another member country to the tax authorities of the citizen's country of residence.
Moreover, they decided to pressure the US, Switzerland, and other key non-EU counties
to agree to similar information exchange. Luxembourg and Austria, two EU countries
with strong banking secrecy laws, had made such agreement with non-EU countries a
condition for themselves agreeing to exchange information. A few days later, the Swiss
3At any given time, the Troika consists of the current, past, and future presidents of the Council of
EU Economics and Finance Ministers (henceforth referred to as Council of Ministers).
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government announced that information exchange was not a feasible solution.
On March 16, 2001, Switzerland and the EU agreed to initiate discussions with the aim
of starting negotiations. While the EU was interested in negotiating over banking secrecy,
Switzerland wished to discuss a number of other issues, including security and migration,
education, and pensions. On June 25, 2001, the EU agreed to start negotiations with
Switzerland on banking secrecy and nine other issues.
During the ﬁrst and second rounds of negotiations, which took place on June 18 and
September 3, 2002, Switzerland agreed to introduce a withholding tax, but ruled out in-
formation exchange with EU countries. On September 7, EU Commissioner Bolkestein
threatened Switzerland with sanctions if it did not agree to exchange information. Pos-
sible sanctions included restrictions on capital movements between Switzerland and EU
countries and a halt to the negotiations on the nine other issues. After EU countries were
unable to agree on sanctions on October 8, 2002, the EU and Switzerland agreed for the
ﬁrst time on the principle of a withholding tax on October 31.
On January 21, 2003, the Council of Ministers agreed in principle with the proposed
solution of a withholding tax. On March 6, an agreement between Switzerland and the
European Commission on all outstanding issues was found. The agreement speciﬁed the
introduction by Switzerland of a withholding tax, initially at the rate of 15%, to be
increased to 20% and ultimately to 35%.4 However, on the following day, the Council
of Ministers was unable to reach an agreement on whether to approve the treaty with
Switzerland or not and postponed its decision on the issue to the next Council. Following
the approval by the Council on June 3, 2003, the agreement was signed.
Table 1 lists the 34 events involving banking secrecy that occurred over the period
December 1998 to June 2003, between the decision by the EU to start exploratory discus-
sions with Switzerland and the signature of the agreement between the two parties. The
list was created from the information posted on the Swiss Parliament's web site; from
the news released by the Swiss Telegraphic Agency; and from the announcements made
by the Administration Fédérale des Finances, the federal body that was in charge of the
negotiations with the EU. Events happening during weekends were recorded as occurring
on the next trading day. Such events are marked with a hash sign in Table 1. For example,
the results of an opinion poll revealing that a majority of Swiss voters would be willing
4The deﬁnition of interest income for purposes of the agreement is quite broad. In addition to any
explicit interest payment, it includes accrued or capitalized interest obtained on selling ﬁxed income
assets, distributions by mutual funds of income originating from interest payments, and gains on the sale
of shares in mutual funds with sizable ﬁxed income investments.
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to relax or abolish banking secrecy were released on Sunday, April 28, 2002. That event
was therefore recorded as occurring on Monday, April 29 (event 16 in Table 1).
In addition, for each event occurring on a trading day, we analyzed the time at which
the information was released. Whenever the information about an event was released after
the 5 p.m. market close, the event was recorded as taking place the following day.5 These
events are marked with an asterisk in Table 1. For example, news about the outcome of
the meeting between EU Commissioner Bolkestein and Swiss Finance Minister Villiger
was released at 5:26 p.m. on May 22, 2001, and the event was therefore recorded as
occurring on May 23. Similarly, news about the second round of negotiations was released
at 7:48 p.m. on September 3, 2002, and the event was therefore recorded as happening on
September 4.
We do not attempt to classify the events in Table 1 as positive or negative from the point
of view of preserving banking secrecy. This is because both interpretations are possible for
most events. Consider for example event 21 on September 9, 2002, when EU Commissioner
Bolkestein threatened Switzerland with sanctions if it did not agree on a compromise
on savings interest. At ﬁrst glance, this event appears to be unambiguously negative.
However, an alternative interpretation is as an act of desperation by a commissioner
otherwise unable to prevail in negotiation. This is because such sanctions were likely to
be opposed by Austria and Luxembourg, two countries that eﬀectively held veto power
over the decision to impose EU-wide sanctions. Conversely, consider event 18 on June 17,
2002, when a bill requiring that banking secrecy be written in the Swiss Constitution was
introduced in parliament. Although this event appears to be positive, it may also reﬂect
the fear on the part of the member who introduced the bill that the Swiss government
could not be relied upon to safeguard banking secrecy.
4 Data and Summary Statistics
In order to investigate the reaction of the prices of Swiss bank shares to the announcements
in Table 1, we obtain stock price data from Datastream for the period ranging from
November 1, 1998 to June 30, 2004 (a total of 1422 trading days).6 Of the 18 Swiss bank
5Information released shortly before the 5 p.m. market close on a given day may not have been fully
incorporated in prices that day. This is not a concern as none of the events in Table 1 occurred between
4:30 and 5 p.m.
6We use November 1 as our starting date because this follows the eﬀective conclusion of the dormant
accounts litigation between Swiss banks and the World Jewish Congress.
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stocks traded on the Swiss stock exchange during the entire period, only 4 are liquid:
UBS, Credit Suisse Group (CSG), Julius Baer (Baer) and Vontobel.7 UBS and CSG are
universal banks active in commercial lending, brokerage, investment banking and wealth
management, whereas Baer and Vontobel are private banks with a strong focus on wealth
management. Numerous other banks of various sizes exist in Switzerland. However, they
either have retained the partnership form (such as the private banks Pictet and Lombard
Odier Darier Hentsch) or their stock is not listed on the stock market (such as Union
Bancaire Privée).
Summary statistics for the four bank stocks considered are presented in Table 2. Av-
erage annual returns range from about −9% for Vontobel, reﬂecting the failure of its e-
banking project, to almost 6% for UBS (we use continuously compounded returns through-
out the study). The annual return volatility of all four stocks exceeds 30%. As of June 30,
2004 (the end of our sample period), the market capitalization of UBS was about double
that of CSG. Baer and Vontobel both had market capitalizations that were smaller than
those of the universal banks by an order of magnitude.
In order to investigate the impact of the negotiations on the valuation of bank stocks,
we compute daily abnormal returns for each stock, as well as the unweighted average
return across the four stocks. This average reﬂects the abnormal return earned by an
investor holding an equally weighted, daily rebalanced portfolio of the four bank stocks.
Considering an equally weighted portfolio avoids having the two universal banks, UBS
and CSG, dominate the portfolio.
We compute abnormal returns as OLS-adjusted returns, i.e., as the residuals from a
market model regression of the form8
Ri,t = βi,0 + βi,1RM,t−1 + βi,2RM,t + βi,3RM,t+1 + ²i,t, (1)
where Ri,t denotes the return on bank i, RM,t the return on the market index, and t the
day considered. In order to control for the presence of nonsynchronous trading, we include
lead and lag terms for the market index in the regression equation (Dimson (1979)).
7The fourteen other stocks are those of Bank Coop, Bank Linth, Bank Sarasin, Bank Valiant, the
New Aargau Bank, the Mortgage Bank of Lenzburg and the banks of the Cantons of Basel, Geneva,
Graubünden, Jura, Lucerne, Valais, Vaud and Zug. Daily turnover in these shares is a small fraction of
the turnover in the four selected stocks.
8Brown and Warner (1985) show that mean-adjusted returns, market-adjusted returns (computed as
the return on the stock minus the return on the stock market index) and OLS-adjusted returns yield
similar results. Since the events considered aﬀect the four banks concurrently in our case, the movements
in the market must be adjusted for explicitly, thus the use of OLS-adjusted returns.
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When estimating equation (1), we use the FTSE Eurotop 100 index in Swiss Francs
an index of the 100 most highly capitalized blue chip companies in Europeas the market
index for two reasons. First, the bank stocks considered in our study constitute a sizable
fraction of the Swiss Market Index (SMI).9 Second, given the importance of the ﬁnancial
sector in Switzerland, the outcome of the banking secrecy negotiations could impact the
Swiss economy at large and therefore aﬀect the returns of non-bank stocks included in
the SMI. Using an European-wide index addresses these concerns.10 Table 3 reports the
regression coeﬃcient estimates and their t-statistics. The coeﬃcients on the contempora-
neous market return range from 0.58 for Vontobel to about 1.28 for CSG and are highly
signiﬁcant for all four banks, with t-statistics between 15.24 for Vontobel and 43.47 for
UBS. The coeﬃcients on the lagged market return are signiﬁcant for UBS and for the two
small banks (and sizeable for the latter, with values exceeding 0.2), while the coeﬃcients
on the leading market return are not.
Table 4 reports the average, median, and standard deviation of daily abnormal returns
in percent for all days, event days, and non-event days. Days are classiﬁed as event
or non-event days using either 1-day windows or 3-day windows around the banking
secrecy announcements. In the classiﬁcation based on 1-day windows, all days on which
an announcement occurs are considered event days; all others are non-event days. This
yields 34 event days and 1388 non-event days (i.e., 34 event day abnormal returns and
1385 non-event day abnormal returns).11 In the classiﬁcation based on 3-day windows, all
days falling inside a 3-day window around an announcement are considered event days; all
others are non-event days. Because some events occur less than three trading days apart
(event pairs 15 and 16, 18 and 19, 22 and 23, and 32 and 33), a total of 7 trading days fall
into two overlapping 3-day windows. Accordingly, the total number of event days using
the 3-day window classiﬁcation is 95, 7 fewer than the 102 event days one would have if
all event pairs were at least 3 trading days apart.
The results in Table 4 reveal that the standard deviation of abnormal returns is higher
for event days than for non-event days. This is the case for all four banks as well as
for their average returns, both for the 1-day window classiﬁcation and for the 3-day
window classiﬁcation. For the 1-day windows, the variance ratio F -statistics show that
the diﬀerence in volatility between event and non-event days is signiﬁcant at the 5%
9The fraction varies between one ﬁfth and one fourth of the index during the period considered.
10In order to assess the robustness of our results, we also performed our empirical analysis using the
FTSE European Bank Index in Swiss Francs. The results (not reported) are very similar.
11One day is lost in transforming prices into returns, and two returns are lost in leading and lagging
the return on the market in equation (1).
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level for three banks (CSG, Baer and Vontobel) and for the average return (statistically
signiﬁcant test statistics are boldfaced throughout the table). For the 3-day windows,
the diﬀerence in volatility is signiﬁcant for two banks (CSG and Vontobel) as well as for
the average return. Thus, the data indicates that bank stocks tended to be more volatile
on and around banking secrecy announcement days than at other times, suggesting that
these announcements did have an impact on the valuation of bank stocks.
Interestingly, the mean equality tests reported in Table 4 reveal that average daily
returns on event days are not statistically diﬀerent from those on non-event days; neither
are median daily returns. This does not imply that the value of banking secrecy is
negligible. Indeed, diﬀerences in average returns between event and non-event days do
not measure the value of banking secrecy itself. Rather, they reﬂect the cumulative
impact that the negotiations had on the valuation of bank stocks. In fact, the value of
banking secrecy could be very large even if average returns did not diﬀer at all between
event and non-event days. This would be the case, for instance, if the probability that
banking secrecy would survive ﬂuctuated during the negotiations, but was comparable
at the beginning and at the end of the negotiations. In this case, return volatility on
event days would be larger than that on non-event days, but there would be no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between average returns on event and non-event days. In order to assess the
value of banking secrecy, a more detailed analysis than a simple comparison of average
returns is required.
5 Valuing Banking Secrecy
The present section obtains a lower bound for the value of banking secrecy to the four
banks considered. Section 5.1 presents a (very) simple framework for thinking about the
problem; Section 5.2 presents the details of our methodology; Section 5.3 measures the
abnormal returns associated with banking secrecy announcements; Section 5.4 interprets
such returns and provides an estimate of the value of banking secrecy.
5.1 A Simple Framework
Let V denote the value of a given bank in the absence of banking secrecy and V s be the
value of banking secrecy to the bank. For simplicity, assume that V and V s are constant
through time. Let pt denote the probability that banking secrecy will be maintained, as
perceived by investors at time t. The probability pt can be expected to change in line
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with the course of the negotiations. The value of the bank on the market at time t, V bt ,
is therefore given by
V bt = V + ptV
s. (2)
Note that if pt were the same at the beginning and at the end of the negotiations, V bt
would be the same as well; average abnormal returns hence would be zero, even though
V s might be very large. This conﬁrms our observation in Section 4 that the ﬁnding of no
overall (end-to-end) impact of the negotiations on the market value of Swiss bank shares
need not imply that banking secrecy has no value.
If either pt or its changes were observed, then the value of banking secrecy could be
estimated straightforwardly from (2) as the change in the bank's market value divided by
the corresponding change in pt. Since neither pt nor its changes are observed, we can only
estimate a lower bound for the value of banking secrecy. The change in value between
dates t and t′ equals (pt′− pt)V s; it constitutes a lower bound on the value of V s, because
pt′ − pt always has magnitude less than 1: a magnitude of 1 would require investors to
be certain that banking secrecy will be maintained at date t, and certain that it will be
abolished at date t′, or the reverse; such large shifts are not consistent with the nature of
the events reported in Table 1.
In order to obtain as high a lower bound on V s as possible, it is necessary to identify
as close in magnitude to 1 a diﬀerence pt′ − pt as possible, within the constraints im-
posed by the data. Such diﬀerence can be inferred from the diﬀerence between highest
and lowest cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), between the day where investors were
most optimistic about the outcome of the negotiations and that were investors were most
pessimistic. The highest lower bound equals (max [pt]−min [pt])V s.
As noted above, besides banking secrecy as such, the negotiations involved many other
value-relevant issues, such as the introduction of a withholding tax and the possibility
of sanctions. Modeling these other issues separately, by including in equation (2) addi-
tional terms for the introduction of the withholding tax and possible sanctions, is made
diﬃcult by the interaction among the diﬀerent issues. For example, the introduction of a
withholding tax (as an alternative to the abolition of secrecy) can be expected to aﬀect
not only the probability that secrecy will be maintained, pt, but also the value of secrecy
conditional on it being maintained, V s. Similarly, the possibility of sanctions aﬀects both
the probability that secrecy will be maintained, pt, and the value of Swiss banks in the
absence of secrecy, V . Equation (2) is a simpliﬁcation, which takes both the value in the
absence of secrecy and the value of secrecy as given and reduces all changes in a bank's
market value to changes in the probability that secrecy is maintained.
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5.2 Methodology
In order to investigate the impact of the individual announcements on banks' stock prices,
we estimate the regression
Ri,t = βi,0 + βi,1RM,t−1 + βi,2RM,t + βi,3RM,t+1 +
K∑
k=1
δi,kDk,t + ²i,t, (3)
where Dk,t denotes a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on the k-th event day and
0 otherwise, and δi,k its estimated coeﬃcient. Since we use one dummy per day, K = 34
for 1-day windows and K = 95 for 3-day windows. Accordingly, the 1-day abnormal
return for a given event is the coeﬃcient of the corresponding dummy variable, and the
3-day abnormal return is the sum of the coeﬃcients of the three corresponding dummy
variables.12 In order to account for the contemporaneous correlation of the residuals,
equation (3) is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression.
Abnormal returns obtained in this fashion could be distorted by the presence of con-
founding events occurring on or around banking secrecy announcements. In order to
address this problem, we searched for potential confounding events in the Lexus/Nexus
database and among the press releases posted by the four banks' on their respective web
sites. We retained all announcements that involved (1) major acquisitions or divestitures,
(2) changes in top management, (3) the hiring or ﬁring of large numbers of employees, (4)
12The 3-day windows of event pairs that occur less than 3 trading days apart (event pairs 15 and 16,
18 and 19, 22 and 23, and 32 and 33) overlap. In order to avoid double-counting, the 3-day abnormal
returns for these events are computed as follows:
 When two events occur on trading days immediately following each other, the abnormal return for
the ﬁrst window is computed as the sum of the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables corresponding
to the day before the ﬁrst event and the day of the event. The abnormal return for the second
window is computed as the sum of the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables corresponding to the
day of the second event and the following day. Hence, both 3-day windows contain 2 days in this
case.
 When two events are separated by one non-event trading day, the abnormal return for the ﬁrst
window is computed as the sum of the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables corresponding to the
day before the ﬁrst event and the day of the event, and half the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable
corresponding to the day following the event. The abnormal return for the second window is
computed as the sum of half the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable corresponding to the day
preceding the second event, the coeﬃcient of the dummy for the event day, and that for the day
after the event. Hence, both 3-day windows contain 2 1/2 days in this case.
The signiﬁcance tests account for the lower number of trading days in the case of these overlapping 3-day
windows.
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legal disputes or regulatory actions, (5) earnings announcements, or (6) share buybacks.
We identiﬁed the events that could potentially aﬀect our results as those events whose
3-day windows overlap with the 3-day windows around banking secrecy announcements
(i.e. taking place two or fewer trading days before or after a banking secrecy announce-
ment). There are 4 such events for UBS, 13 for CSG, 5 for Baer and 4 for Vontobel. Table
5 reports the date and description of these confounding events, as well as the banking
secrecy announcements whose 3-day windows overlap with the 3-day window around the
confounding event.
A potential approach to account for confounding events is to estimate their impact
on stock returns and adjust the estimated abnormal returns attributed to the banking
secrecy announcements accordingly. Due to the relatively small number of events in our
sample and their large degree of heterogeneity, however, this approach would yield very
noisy estimates. Instead, we use the simpler, but more robust approach of leaving out
the days directly aﬀected by confounding events and giving a lower weight to days lying
between a confounding event and a banking secrecy announcement. Speciﬁcally, when
computing abnormal returns for each banking secrecy announcement, confounding events
are taken into account as follows:
 Whenever a confounding event for a given bank occurs on the same day as a banking
secrecy announcement, no abnormal return for the banking secrecy announcement
aﬀected is computed, neither for the 1-day window nor for the 3-day window. Such
announcements are marked with an asterisk in the column Events Aﬀected in
Table 5.
 Whenever a confounding event and a banking secrecy announcement occur on trad-
ing days immediately following each other, the 1-day abnormal return is obtained
normally using the corresponding dummy variable coeﬃcient. The abnormal return
for the 3-day window is computed by leaving out the day of the confounding event.
Hence, as in the case of two banking secrecy announcements immediately following
each other, the 3-day event window contains 2 days. Such events are marked with
a hash sign in Table 5.
 Whenever a confounding event and a banking secrecy announcement are separated
by one non-event day, the 1-day abnormal return is obtained normally. The abnor-
mal return for the 3-day window is computed by giving a weight of one half to
the day lying between the two events. Again, as in the case of two banking secrecy
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announcements separated by one non-event trading day, the 3-day event window
contains 2 1/2 days. Such events are also marked with a hash sign in Table 5.
5.3 Abnormal Returns on Announcement Dates
Table 6 reports the 1-day and 3-day abnormal return on each of the four bank stocks,
as well as the average abnormal return across banks for each of the 34 banking secrecy
announcements. Cells corresponding to events for which no abnormal return is computed
for a particular bank due to a confounding event are marked with an asterisk, and 3-day
abnormal return estimates that are based on two or two and one-half dummy variable
coeﬃcients only because of a confounding event are marked with a hash sign. At the 5%
level statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns are boldfaced. For individual banks, the
signiﬁcance of 1-day abnormal returns is assessed using the t-statistic of the corresponding
dummy variable coeﬃcient. For 3-day abnormal returns, it is based on the t-statistic for
the test that the sum of the coeﬃcients of the dummy variables included in the event
window is zero.
The average abnormal return on each day is computed as the average of the dummy
variable coeﬃcients for the banks not aﬀected by a confounding event on that day. Its
signiﬁcance is assessed by performing a t-test that the average of the coeﬃcients of the
dummy variables included in the average is zero. This ensures that missing values do not
distort our signiﬁcance tests. For example, for event 4, no abnormal return is available for
Vontobel because of a confounding event. Hence, the average 1-day abnormal return for
event 4 is computed based on the dummy variable coeﬃcients for UBS, CSG and Baer,
and its signiﬁcance assessed by testing whether the average of the three corresponding
dummy coeﬃcients is zero. Similarly, for the 3-day window, the average abnormal return
is based on nine dummy variablesthree per dayand its signiﬁcance is assessed by
testing whether the sum of the three daily average returns is zero.
Table 6 reports abnormal returns. Relatively few are signiﬁcant; even fewer are sig-
niﬁcant for more than a single bank and for both the 1- and 3-day windows. Overall,
considering 1-day windows, there are three statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns for
UBS, four each for CSG and Baer, and ﬁve each for Vontobel and the average abnormal
return. For 3-day windows, there is a single signiﬁcant abnormal return for UBS, three
each for CSG and Baer, six for Vontobel, and four for the average abnormal return.
When examining the share price response of 4 banks to 34 events, we should expect
approximately 7 events to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level even if there is in fact no signiﬁcant
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response of the share prices to the events (7 ≈ 4× 34× 0.05). In order to avoid possible
Type I errors, we consider only those events that are statistically signiﬁcant for at least
two banks for both the 1-day and 3-day windows: the multiple signiﬁcance requirement
makes such signiﬁcance less likely to be mere Type I error. We are thus left with three
events: events 22, 33 and 34.13
Event 22EU Commissioner Bolkestein writing in the Financial Times I cannot stand
Switzerland cheating on taxis associated with large and signiﬁcant abnormal returns
for both UBS and CSG. These returns are −5.63% over the 1-day window and −11.20%
over the 3-day window for UBS, and −3.51% and −10.37% for CSG.14 However, event 22
has almost no impact on the small private banks. A possible explanation for this result
is that, in contrast to the small banks, UBS and CSG would have been strongly aﬀected
by sanctions from the EU because of their strong presence in most European ﬁnancial
centers.
Event 33the Council of Ministers' being unable to decide whether to approve the
proposed agreement with Switzerland or notis associated with negative abnormal re-
turns for all four banks. Abnormal returns lie between −1.64% for UBS and −9.38% for
Vontobel on the day of the announcement, and are signiﬁcant for three of the four banks.
For 3-day windows, abnormal returns range from −1.28% to −13.52%, and are signiﬁ-
cant for two banks, Baer and Vontobel.15 The most likely cause of these strong negative
13Events that exhibit statistically signiﬁcant returns but do not meet our criterion are the following.
Event 9the agreement between Switzerland and the EU to initiate discussions with the aim of starting
negotiationsis associated with a signiﬁcant 1-day abnormal return of −4.28% for Vontobel. Event
10a meeting between Switzerland and the EU to discuss the taxation of savings interestis associated
with a signiﬁcant 1-day abnormal return of 2.74% for UBS, while Vontobel displays signiﬁcant 1-day
and 3-day abnormal returns of 5.68% and 8.34%, respectively. Event 18the introduction of a bill in
parliament requiring that banking secrecy be written in the Swiss Constitutionis associated with a
single signiﬁcant abnormal return, a 3-day return of −6.13% for Vontobel. For event 19the ﬁrst round
of negotiations between Switzerland and the EUCSG and Baer have signiﬁcant 1-day abnormal returns
of −3.48% and −4.20%, respectively. Event 23EU countries being unable to agree on sanctions against
Switzerlandis associated with positive abnormal returns for Baer (5.37% over the 1-day window and
6.05% over the 3-day window). There are also signiﬁcant abnormal returns for individual banks around
events 24, 26, 27 and 28, but here again, no clear pattern is apparent. Event 31the Council of Ministers
agreeing in principle with the proposed introduction by Switzerland of a withholding taxis associated
with a signiﬁcant 1-day abnormal return of −2.77% for UBS.
14The returns for CSG may be aﬀected by CSG's announcement on October 8, 2002 of its decision
to lay oﬀ 1700 employees. In accordance with the discussion in Section 5.2, this confounding event is
accounted for by using 2 days for the 3-day window.
15The returns for Baer may be aﬀected by Baer's issuance of a proﬁt warning on March 13, 2003 and
its announcement on that same day that assets under management are still falling and that it is laying
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returns is that a rejection of the proposed agreement by EU Finance Ministers would
probably have triggered additional negotiation rounds and prompted EU negotiators to
take a much tougher stance. Accordingly, with the single exception of confounding-event
aﬀected 3-day return for CSG, abnormal returns for all banks are positive when the pro-
posed agreement is ﬁnally approved on June 4 (event 34), with values between 0.47% for
CSG and 7.56% for Vontobel for 1-day windows and between 0.15% for UBS and 14.49%
for Vontobel for 3-day windows. These abnormal returns are signiﬁcant for Baer and
Vontobel, both on the day of the announcement and for the corresponding 3-day window.
The last two rows in Table 6 show the total abnormal returns over all events, as well
as their t-statistics. Total abnormal returns over all 1-day windows range from −14.63%
for CSG to 2.70% for Vontobel, and are not signiﬁcant for any of the banks, nor for the
average return. For 3-day windows, abnormal returns range from −12.52% for CSG to
13.48% for Baer, and are again not signiﬁcant for any bank. Thus, as already noted in
Section 4, the negotiations were not associated with a statistically signiﬁcant decline in
the market value of Swiss bank shares. We oﬀer an economic interpretation of such result
in Section 5.4.
Figure 1 shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the four bank stocks for
each of the 34 announcement days. The upper panel shows these abnormal returns for
1-day windows, the lower panel for 3-day windows. In each picture, the solid line depicts
the cumulative abnormal return considering all announcements, the dashed line the CAR
considering only announcements with statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns, the dot-
ted line the CAR considering only announcements with abnormal returns that meet the
multiple signiﬁcance requirement: abnormal returns are signiﬁcant for at least two banks
for both the 1-day and 3-day windows. Hence, for the solid line, horizontal segments
correspond to events for which no abnormal return is computed because of a confounding
event; for the dashed line, they correspond to events with either no or insigniﬁcant abnor-
mal returns; ﬁnally, for the dotted line, they correspond to events with abnormal returns
that do not meet the multiple signiﬁcance requirement. The pictures reveal sizeable CARs
in some cases (for example, −14.63% for CSG using 1-day windows). However, as will be
recalled from Table 6, all CARs are statistically insigniﬁcant.
Figure 1 also reveals a similarity in the pattern of CARs for UBS and CSG on the one
hand and for Baer and Vontobel on the other. This similarity is apparent for both bank
pairs for the 1-day windows, and for the pair UBS and CSG for the 3-day windows.
oﬀ employees. In accordance with the discussion in Section 5.2, this confounding event is accounted for
by using 2 1/2 days for the 3-day window.
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Table 7 reports the abnormal return correlation across banks on event and on non-
event days, as well as the diﬀerence between the two.16 The correlations are positive for
all bank pairs, both for 1-day windows and for 3-day windows. The top panel reveals that
correlations on event days are quite large and statistically signiﬁcant for three bank pairs.
In addition to the pairs UBS/CSG (with values of 0.5702 for 1-day windows and 0.5333
for 3-day windows) and Baer/Vontobel (with values of 0.5690 and 0.3540), for which a
sizable correlation was already apparent in Figure 1, there is a strong abnormal return
correlation for the pair CSG/Baer (with values of 0.4109 and 0.3367).
Abnormal return correlations on non-event days, reported in the middle panel of Table
7, are signiﬁcant for all bank pairs thanks to the larger number of observations. As was the
case for event days, the correlations are largest for the pairs UBS/CSG, CSG/Baer and
Baer/Vontobel. The bottom panel of Table 7 reports the diﬀerence between the abnormal
return correlation on event days and that on non-event days. For 1-day windows, all
correlations are sizably larger on event days than on non-event days with two exceptions,
the pairs UBS/Baer and CSG/Vontobel. For 3-day windows, abnormal return correlations
are larger on event days with two exceptions, the pairs UBS/Baer and CSG/Vontobel.
However, the Jennrich (1970) test does not reject the null hypothesis of no change in
correlation between event and non-event days. Thus, although the point estimates are
generally higher, the banking secrecy negotiations were not associated with a statistically
signiﬁcant increase in the abnormal return correlation across banks.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns of the four bank stocks. The
overall impact of the negotiations on returns is small both for 1-day windows and 3-day
windows, even if only events with signiﬁcant abnormal returns are considered.
5.4 Interpretation and Value
We now turn to the interpretation of our results. Perhaps the ﬁrst conclusion to be
drawn from these results is this: banking secrecy has a value, at least to the private
banks, namely Baer and Vontobel. This is a clear implication of the decline in value that
accompanies event 33, the inability of the Council of Ministers to reach an agreement on
whether to approve the treaty with Switzerland, and the rebound in value around event
34, the approval and signing of the agreement. Thus, confronted with the possibility that
the EU may not be satisﬁed with the withholding tax proposed by Switzerland, at least
16For each bank pair, the correlation on event days is computed on the basis of days where neither of
the two banks considered is aﬀected by a confounding event.
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not in the form speciﬁed in the agreement, and that it may insist on the complete removal
of banking secrecy for EU residents, Baer and Vontobel suﬀered a marked decline in their
share prices. Relieved that such would not be the case after all, they saw their share
prices recover the loss in value.
If banking secrecy is important, a number of questions arise. Why did UBS not suﬀer
from event 33, and why did it not beneﬁt from event 34, at least not to a statistically
and economically signiﬁcant extent? Why were the results for CSG intermediate between
those for the private banks and those for UBS? Why did the 32 events that precede
events 33 and 34 have no clear eﬀect on the four banks, with the exception of event 22
on UBS and CSG?17 And why did event 22, EU Commissioner Bolkestein's writing in the
Financial Times that he cannot stand Switzerland cheating on tax aﬀect UBS and CSG
but not Baer and Vontobel?
The absence of reaction on the part of UBS to events 33 and 34 is consistent with a
number of statements by UBS to the eﬀect that it has developed its foreign private banking
operations to such an extent that it no longer needs to rely on its Swiss operations, those
that can prevail themselves of banking secrecy, to attract and keep foreign clients.18 CSG
may be an intermediate case, not nearly as dependent on domestic operations and banking
secrecy as the private banks, yet not as independent of banking secrecy as UBS appears
to be.19
Not only have UBS and CSG developed their foreign private banking operations, they
have also developed their foreign investment banking operations. A sizeable fraction of
the European operations are in London. We believe this explains the negative reaction of
UBS and CSG to event 22, Commissioner Bolkestein's letter in the Financial Times. EU
sanctions on Switzerland, threatened by Commissioner Bolkestein in event 21, probably
were viewed as not feasible. This was conﬁrmed by event 23, EU countries unable to
agree on sanctions, and acknowledged by Commissioner Bolkestein himself in an interview
with Swiss newspapers (event 24).20 A possible explanation for the failure to agree on
17By a clear eﬀect, we mean one that meets the multiple signiﬁcance requirement: it is signiﬁcant for
more than a single bank and for both windows.
18In the summer of 2002, UBS reported that following Italy's tax amnesty at the beginning of that
year, almost half of the assets repatriated by Italian clients had been directed to UBS's domestic Italian
business.
19In 2004, the last year of our sample period, 36.4% of UBS's operating income was generated out-
side Switzerland. The corresponding ﬁgures for CSG, Baer, and Vontobel are 37.7%, 23.6%, and 12.4%,
respectively. Note that these ﬁgures include income from investment banking and retail, because disag-
gregated ﬁgures for private banking alone are not publicly available.
20It is also conﬁrmed by the weak to non-existent reactions of UBS and CSG to event 33, the inability
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sanctions may have been Luxembourg and Austria's opposition to such sanctions.21 In
contrast to EU sanctions on Switzerland, UK sanctions on the London-based investment
banking operations of UBS and CSG may have been viewed as being in the realm of the
possible: UK Chancellor Gordon Brown was perceived as being one of the most determined
opponents of Swiss banking secrecy. Such sanctions, which may have been suggested by
the publication of Commissioner Bolkestein's letter in the Financial Times, would have
aﬀected UBS and CSG but would have been unlikely to aﬀect Baer and Vontobel, which
have little to no presence in London.
A political economy interpretation of UBS and CSG's reactions, or lack thereof to
events 22, 33, and 34 is that the universal banks may have chosen purposely to decrease
reliance on banking secrecy in order not to jeopardize their investment banking operations
in London and New York. There is much evidence consistent with the importance of
political economy considerations: to take but one example, UBS and CSG were among
the ﬁrst European banks to heed US calls for ceasing business dealings with Iran, part of
the long tug of war between the Islamic Republic and the United States. Underlining the
diﬀerence between universal and private banks, Baer publicly stated its desire to expand
its Middle-Eastern private banking business, explicitly referring to Iran; UBS advised its
Iranian clients to transfer their assets to Baer.22
Interestingly, event 22 seems to have left other European banks unaﬀected. Indeed,
when we repeat the analysis of Section 5.3 for the FTSE index of European banks in place
of the four Swiss banks, the abnormal return is insigniﬁcant, both for the 1-day window
and for the 3-day window. For the 3-day window, the small, statistically insigniﬁcant,
negative abnormal return of 1.5% roughly corresponds to the product of the weight of
UBS and CSG in the European bank index and the abnormal returns of these two banks
around event 22.
We also repeat the analysis of Section 5.3 for two individual European private banks,
Italy's Fideuram and Sweden's Carnegie.23 Event 22 leaves Fideuram unaﬀected. In con-
trast, event 22 signiﬁcantly aﬀects Carnegie for the 3-day window. Surprisingly perhaps,
event 22's eﬀect is negative, suggesting that Carnegie may in fact have suﬀered from the
of the Council of Ministers to reach an agreement on whether to approve the treaty with Switzerland.
Surely, had EU sanctions on Switzerland been considered a real possibility, investors would have feared
that the EU would resort to such sanctions for the purpose of obtaining a more satisfactory treaty.
21On October 7, 2002, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker called for the EU to cease
treating Switzerland as the Iraq of the Alps.
22Somewhat ironically, Baer was 21%-owned by UBS at the time; the stake was later sold.
23There are very few private banks quoted on an exchange.
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threat directed at its Swiss competitors. The signiﬁcance of event 22 (-19%) is preceded
by that of event 21 (-13%) and followed by that of event 23 (+18%): Carnegie suﬀers on
the day Commissioner Bolkestein threatens Switzerland with sanctions; it beneﬁts on the
day EU countries are unable to agree on such sanctions.24 In our opinion, such ﬁndings
have less to do with banking secrecy than with the confounding event that followed event
23: Carnegie announced a 59% decline in proﬁts on 15 October 2002. The dramatic move-
ments in Carnegie's share price suggest investors were very uncertain about Carnegie's
proﬁtability prior to the earnings announcement.25
We can relate our interpretation of events 22, 33, and 34 to the framework presented
in Section 5.1. Event 33 represents a decrease in pt and event 34 an increase. That the
universal banks are little aﬀected suggests that V s is close to zero for these banks, that
is, banking secrecy has little to no value for the universal banks. The lack of response of
the private banks' share prices to event 22 suggests that the event leaves pt unaﬀected.
The universal banks' deﬁnite response therefore must pertain to these banks' value in the
absence of secrecy, V . No inference regarding the value of banking secrecy thus can be
drawn from event 22.
We are now in a position to estimate a value for banking secrecy. Our results suggest
that it is very low if not nil, in statistical terms at least, for UBS and CSG; it is positive for
Baer and Vontobel. We consider 3-day windows; we use event 33 to estimate the desired
lower bound for Baer and events 33 and 34 for Vontobel. For Baer, the maximum CAR is
zero, maintained over the ﬁrst 32 events; the minimum CAR is −8.7%, attained at event
33; the +7.4% return on event 34 is not so large as to raise the maximum CAR above
zero. For Vontobel, the minimum CAR is −13.5%, attained at event 33; the maximum
CAR is +1%, attained at event 34. The value of banking secrecy therefore must be at
least 1 − exp(−0.087) = 8.3% of Baer's equity and exp(0.01) − exp(−0.135) = 13.6%
of Vontobel's.26 In absolute terms, this amounts to 294 million Swiss Francs (¿196m,
$294m) for Julius Baer and 188 million Swiss Francs (¿125m, $188m) for Vontobel, at
the end of our sample period on June 30, 2004.
Finally, we turn to events 1 to 32, exclusive of event 22 discussed above. Why did none
of these events aﬀect the four banks consideredand the two private banks in particular
24Fideuram remains entirely unaﬀected.
25When we repeat the the analysis of Section 5.3 for events 33 and 34, we ﬁnd neither Carnegie, nor
Fideuram, nor other European banks (as represented by the FTSE index of European banks) to be
aﬀected by these events.
26Recall from the discussion in Section 5.1 that the diﬀerence between highest and lowest CAR is used
to infer the diﬀerence max [pt]−min [pt].
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consistently across banks and windows and in a statistically signiﬁcant sense? In our
view, what our results suggest is that, until event 33 at least, investors were remarkably
sanguine about the implications of the negotiations and their perceived outcome for the
proﬁtability of the Swiss-based private banking operations of the Swiss banks. Perhaps
they felt they could rely on the convergence of interests between Switzerland on the one
hand and EU members Austria and Luxembourg on the other to ensure that banking
secrecy, present in these two countries as well as in Switzerland, would be preserved.
Perhaps they were conﬁdent that Swiss negotiators would not budge from their oﬀer
of introducing a withholding tax. Regardless, it is interesting to note that our results
indicate that even a withholding tax was not viewed as compromising the proﬁtability of
private banking operations.
How could that be? One explanation is statistical; it revolves around the large stan-
dard error of 34 abnormal returns cumulated. The other is economic; it revolves around
the relative ease of circumventing the withholding tax. Such ease is attributable to the
restricted applicability of the tax, which 1) applies to interest paid on bank deposits, debt
securities, and some ﬁxed income mutual funds, not to dividends and capital gains on
equities and 2) applies to payments made to individuals resident in the European Union,
not to payments made to legal entities such as foundations and trusts, even where the
beneﬁcial owner of such an entity is an individual resident in the European Union. It is
easy to see that the tax can to some extent at least be circumvented by a) reallocating the
Swiss portion of a portfolio from bonds to stocks, with oﬀsetting changes in the portfolio's
non-Swiss portion, b) holding non-debt securities that oﬀer debt-like payoﬀs, such as var-
ious forms of structured products with capital protection, c) subscribing to life insurance
policies whose savings component oﬀers debt-like payouts, and d) setting up a trust or
a foundation. Three observations suggest that such schemes were relatively successful at
circumventing the tax. First, modest amounts have been withheld since the introduction
of the tax on July 1, 2005: 160 million Swiss Francs during the second half of 2005, 540
million in 2006, and 650 million in 2007. Second, there was a disproportionate increase
in the liabilities of Swiss banks towards non-EU-based non-banking entities (nonbanks),
suggesting increased used of trusts and foundations: Swiss National Bank (2005, 2008,
Table 32, Column (1) minus Column (2)) statistics indicate that, between December 31,
2004 and December 31, 2007, the liabilities of Swiss banks towards nonbanks based in the
EU 15 countries rose from 253 to 333 billion Swiss francs, an increase of 31.8%; liabilities
towards nonbanks based in Australia, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. rose
from 223 to 422 billion Swiss francs, an increase of 88.7%; last but not least, liabilities
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towards nonbanks based in oﬀshore centers (excluding Aruba, Barbados, Macau and the
West Indies because of missing data) rose from 182 to 365 billion Swiss francs, an increase
of 100.2%. Third, on November 13, 2008, the European Commission explicitly acknowl-
edged that the EU Savings Directive (on which is based the withholding tax agreed to
by Switzerland) can easily be circumvented. It proposed a number of changes to better
ensure the taxation of interest payments which are channeled through intermediate tax-
exempted structures as well as to extend the scope of the Directive to income equivalent
to interest obtained through investments in some innovative ﬁnancial products as well as
in certain life insurances products.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis reveals that banking secrecy has a value to the private banks; this value is of
the order of 8 to 14% of the banks' equity, at the minimum. In contrast, banking secrecy
seems to hold little to no value to the universal banks; these seem principally to have
feared the imposition of sanctions on their London-based investment banking operations.
The analysis also reveals that the withholding tax had no impact on the value of the
banks, private as well as universal. That last ﬁnding may be a statistical artifact due the
large standard error of 34 abnormal returns cumulated; it may be due the relative ease
with which the tax can be circumvented.
Our ﬁndings pertain to the period 1998-2003; how valid are they to the present period,
characterized by an ongoing ﬁnancial crisis and much more determined opposition to bank-
ing secrecy? Perhaps surprisingly, the ﬁrst two ﬁndings appear to remain valid. Consider
the ﬁnding that banking secrecy has little to no value to the universal banks: CSG's CFO
Renato Fassbind recently stated that CSG does not fear thepartialabandonment of
banking secrecy.27 He added that he expects funds that might be withdrawn from CSG's
Swiss branches to be transferred to CSG's foreign branches, to what he calls CSG's on-
shore network.28 Now turn to the ﬁnding that banking secrecy has a value to the private
banks: Ivan Pictet, a partner in the eponymous Geneva-based private bank, stated in
an interview that he expects ﬁnance to halve from 12 to 6-7% of Geneva's GDP in case
banking secrecy is abandoned; private banking in Geneva is conducted overwhelmingly
27Mr. Fassbind does not specify what he means by the partial abandonment of banking secrecy; he
is quoted in the April 25, 2009 issue of Geneva's Le Temps.
28Onshore banking is to be contrasted with oﬀshore banking, the latter conducted within Switzerland
on behalf of non-Swiss based clients.
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by the private rather than the universal banks.29
What of the universal banks' investment banking operations? These remain important
to the universal banks: despite sizeable losses attributable to the subprime crisis, CSG's
investment banking income accounted for nearly two and a half times the bank's private
banking income during the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. The political economy considerations
mentioned in Section 5.4 therefore should remain valid for the universal banks: these will
go to great length to avoid sanctions or restrictions in London or New York.
It is diﬃcult, however, to be as sanguine about present developments as investors
might have been at the time the withholding tax was imposed: the EU and indeed much
of the world appear to be intent on ending banking secrecy or, at the very least, severely
restricting its scope; some Swiss banks at least might be in for some challenging times.
29Mr. Pictet's ﬁgure is not directly comparable to ours: it includes the salaries paid by private banks to
reﬂect the sector's value-added. The interview can be found in the February 24, 2009 issue of Le Temps.
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Event Date Description
1 12/01/1998 EU Finance Ministers ask the European Commission and the Troika to start
exploratory discussions with Switzerland on the taxation of savings interest.
2 03/02/1999 Exploratory meeting between the European Commission, the Troika and the
Swiss Finance Minister to discuss the taxation of savings interest.
3 06/09/2000 EU Commissioner Bolkestein and Swiss Finance Minister Villiger meet in Bern
to discuss the taxation of savings interest.
4 06/20/2000 EU Finance Ministers agree to work towards common rules to tax savings
income. In the meantime, they agree to exchange information on savings in-
come with other EU countries. They decide to enter into discussions with the
U.S. and key third countries (such as Switzerland) to promote the adoption of
equivalent measures in those countries.
5 06/28/2000 The Swiss government announces that information exchange is not a feasible
solution.
6 09/13/2000 The Swiss government again declares to Parliament that it will not exchange
information.
7 11/27/2000 EU Finance Ministers agree on a minimum withholding tax rate of 15% for 3
years and then 20% until information exchange is implemented by a member
country.
8*# 03/12/2001 The Swiss government again declares to Parliament that it is not willing to
exchange information and abolish banking secrecy.
9 03/16/2001 Switzerland and the EU agree to initiate discussions with the aim of starting
negotiations.
10 04/11/2001 Meeting between Switzerland and the EU to discuss the taxation of savings
interest.
11* 05/23/2001 Meeting between EU Commissioner Bolkestein and Swiss Finance Minister Vil-
liger in Bern. Switzerland agrees in principle to introduce a withholding tax
on savings interest, but rules out information exchange.
12* 06/26/2001 The EU agrees to start negotiations with Switzerland on banking secrecy and
9 other issues.
13* 09/20/2001 UK Chancellor Brown challenges Switzerland to relax its banking secrecy in
order to ensure there was no hiding place for terrorist money.
14* 12/13/2001 UK Chancellor Brown declares that Switzerland should join the ﬁght against
tax evasion.
15 04/25/2002 A Swiss minister declares that banking secrecy is not negotiable but is evolving.
16# 04/29/2002 An opinion poll reveals that a majority of Swiss voters (65%) would be willing
to relax or abolish banking secrecy.
17 05/24/2002 Another opinion poll reveals that a majority of Swiss voters (58%) wants to
keep banking secrecy as is.
Table 1: News Announcements about Banking Secrecy. News announcements about
banking secrecy over the period from December 1998 to June 2003. The list was created from
the information posted on the Swiss Parliament's web site; from the news released by the Swiss
Telegraphic Agency; and from the announcements made by the Administration Fédérale des
Finances. Events marked with a hash sign are those happening on week-ends and recorded as
occurring on the next trading day. Events marked with an asterisk are those for which information
was released after 4:30 p.m. and recorded as taking place the following day.
Continued
Event Date Description
18 06/17/2002 A bill is introduced in Parliament requiring that banking secrecy be written in
the Swiss Constitution.
19 06/18/2002 First round of negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. Switzerland agrees
to introduce a withholding tax, but rules out information exchange. The EU
requests information exchange.
20* 09/04/2002 Second round of negotiations between Switzerland and the EU. Switzerland
agrees to introduce a withholding tax, but again rules out information ex-
change. The EU again requests information exchange.
21# 09/09/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein threatens Switzerland with sanctions if it does
not agree to a compromise on savings interest.
22 10/07/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein writes in the Financial Times I cannot stand
Switzerland cheating on tax.
23 10/08/2002 EU countries are unable to agree on sanctions against Switzerland. Switzerland
once again oﬀers to introduce a withholding tax.
24 10/24/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein tells Swiss newspapers that sanctions are not
really feasible.
25* 11/01/2002 The EU and Switzerland agree for the ﬁrst time on the principle of a withhold-
ing tax. There is still disagreement on the applicable rate.
26* 11/06/2002 EU Commissioner Bolkestein tells EU Finance ministers that Switzerland
agrees to a withholding rate of 35%, provided that the same rate is used by EU
countries electing to use a withholding tax instead of information exchange.
UK Chancellor Brown requests information exchange.
27* 11/19/2002 The ﬁnance committee of the Swiss Parliament recommends writing banking
secrecy in the Constitution.
28 11/29/2002 The Swiss government declares in Parliament that the agreement with the EU
will be applicable to residents of EU countries only and will not be extended
to other countries.
29 12/12/2002 The Council of Ministers decides to postpone the decision on the taxation of
savings interest to January 21, 2003.
30 12/19/2002 The Swiss Finance Minister explains that banking secrecy is not negotiable,
even if the EU threatens with sanctions.
31* 01/22/2003 The Council of Ministers agrees in principle with the proposed solution, ac-
cording to which Switzerland would keep its banking secrecy, but introduce a
withholding tax.
32* 03/07/2003 Switzerland and the European Commission ﬁnd an agreement on all outstand-
ing issues. This agreement must be approved by the Council of Ministers.
33*# 03/10/2003 The Council of Ministers is unable to reach an agreement on whether to approve
the treaty with Switzerland or not. The decision is postponed to the next
Council.
34* 06/04/2003 The Council of Ministers approves the proposed agreement with Switzerland.
The agreement is signed.
27
Bank UBS CSG Baer Vontobel
Average Return (% p.a.) 5.92 −2.17 −3.10 −9.41
Return Standard Deviation (% p.a.) 31.64 42.18 38.84 38.23
Market Capitalization, 06/30/2004, CHF billiona 98.001 49.238 3.538 1.494
a Source: Quarterly Financial Reports of the four banks.
Table 2: Summary Statistics. Summary statistics for the four bank stocks over the period
from November 1, 1998 to June 30, 2004.
28
Bank UBS CSG Baer Vontobel Average
Constant 0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 −0.0003 0.0001
(1.1922) (0.2806) (0.0378) (−0.4566) (0.2401)
RM,t−1 0.0658 0.0429 0.2420 0.2029 0.1384
(2.9245) (1.3870) (7.1359) (5.3228) (6.8524)
RM,t 0.9783 1.2755 0.9237 0.5807 0.9396
(43.4686) (41.2384) (27.2494) (15.2393) (46.5317)
RM,t+1 0.0306 −0.0246 0.0033 0.0159 0.0063
(1.3576) (−0.7942) (0.0978) (0.4171) (0.3120)
R2 0.5722 0.5457 0.3578 0.1545 0.6088
σ² 0.0131 0.0180 0.0198 0.0222 0.0118
Table 3: Regression Results for the Four Bank Stocks and the Av-
erage Return. Results of market model regressions of the form Ri,t =
βi,0 + βi,1RM,t−1 + βi,2RM,t + βi,3RM,t+1 + ²i,t for the four bank stocks as
well as for the unweighted average return across the four stocks, reﬂecting the
return on an equally weighted, daily rebalanced portfolio of the four stocks.
Lead and lag terms of the market index return RM are included in order to
control for the presence of nonsynchronous trading. The upper part of the ta-
ble shows the coeﬃcient estimates and, in parentheses, their t-statistics. The
bottom part shows the coeﬃcient of determination R2 and the standard error
of the regression residuals, σ².
29
1-
da
y
3-
da
y
U
BS
CS
G
Ba
er
Vo
nt
ob
el
Av
er
ag
e
U
BS
CS
G
Ba
er
Vo
nt
ob
el
Av
er
ag
e
A
ll
da
ys
M
ea
n
(%
)
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
M
ed
ia
n
(%
)
0.
02
69
0.
03
06
−0
.0
33
7
−0
.0
24
0
0.
01
56
0.
02
69
0.
03
06
−0
.0
33
7
−0
.0
24
0
0.
01
56
St
d.
de
v.
(%
)
0.
01
31
0.
01
80
0.
01
98
0.
02
22
0.
01
18
0.
01
31
0.
01
80
0.
01
98
0.
02
22
0.
01
18
Ev
en
td
ay
s
M
ea
n
(%
)
−0
.1
58
8
−0
.3
19
3
0.
14
29
0.
01
61
−0
.0
79
8
0.
02
29
0.
11
40
0.
24
35
−0
.1
89
6
0.
04
77
M
ed
ia
n
(%
)
−0
.0
54
3
0.
03
67
−0
.3
50
0
0.
14
63
−0
.2
98
5
0.
08
93
0.
14
67
0.
00
81
−0
.2
07
2
0.
02
03
St
d.
de
v.
(%
)
1.
51
54
2.
39
39
2.
59
92
3.
16
40
1.
74
81
1.
43
06
2.
10
56
2.
12
81
3.
59
28
1.
55
59
N
on
-e
ve
nt
da
ys
M
ea
n
(%
)
0.
00
39
0.
00
78
−0
.0
03
5
−0
.0
00
4
0.
00
20
−0
.0
01
6
−0
.0
08
2
−0
.0
17
5
0.
01
36
−0
.0
03
4
M
ed
ia
n
(%
)
0.
02
77
0.
03
06
−0
.0
32
4
−0
.0
24
1
0.
01
89
0.
02
42
0.
02
83
−0
.0
36
5
−0
.0
18
0
0.
01
41
St
d.
de
v.
(%
)
1.
30
64
1.
78
56
1.
95
84
2.
19
38
1.
15
98
1.
30
30
1.
77
91
1.
96
34
2.
08
91
1.
14
52
Te
st
fo
r
eq
ua
lm
ea
ns
t-s
ta
tis
tic
−0
.6
20
3
−0
.7
91
5
0.
32
62
0.
03
02
−0
.2
71
2
0.
16
22
0.
55
15
1.
16
03
−0
.5
44
7
0.
31
41
P
-V
al
ue
0.
53
51
0.
42
88
0.
74
43
0.
97
59
0.
78
63
0.
87
12
0.
58
14
0.
24
61
0.
58
61
0.
75
35
Te
st
fo
r
eq
ua
lm
ed
ia
ns
K
ru
sk
al
-W
al
lis
χ
2
-st
at
ist
ic
0.
14
21
0.
12
36
0.
12
94
0.
05
83
0.
48
74
0.
28
37
1.
15
88
0.
91
33
0.
10
75
0.
31
23
P
-V
al
ue
0.
70
62
0.
72
51
0.
71
91
0.
80
92
0.
48
51
0.
59
43
0.
28
17
0.
33
92
0.
74
30
0.
57
63
Te
st
fo
r
eq
ua
lv
ar
ia
nc
es
Va
ria
nc
e
ra
tio
F
-st
at
ist
ic
1.
34
57
1.
79
73
1.
76
16
2.
08
00
2.
27
16
1.
20
55
1.
40
07
1.
17
48
2.
95
75
1.
84
60
P
-v
al
ue
0.
09
22
0.
00
38
0.
00
51
0.
00
03
0.
00
01
0.
09
43
0.
00
85
0.
12
81
0.
00
00
0.
00
00
Ta
bl
e
4:
M
ea
ns
,M
ed
ia
ns
,a
nd
St
an
da
rd
D
ev
ia
tio
ns
of
A
bn
or
m
al
R
et
ur
ns
on
Ev
en
t
an
d
N
on
-E
ve
nt
D
ay
s.
A
bn
or
m
al
re
tu
rn
s
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
as
O
LS
-a
dj
us
te
d
re
tu
rn
s
fro
m
m
ar
ke
t
m
od
el
re
gr
es
sio
ns
of
th
e
fo
rm
R
i,
t
=
β
i,
0
+
β
i,
1
R
M
,t
−1
+
β
i,
2
R
M
,t
+
β
i,
3
R
M
,t
+
1
+
² i
,t
es
tim
at
ed
fo
r
th
e
fo
ur
ba
nk
st
oc
ks
as
we
ll
as
fo
r
th
e
un
we
ig
ht
ed
av
er
ag
e
re
tu
rn
ac
ro
ss
th
e
fo
ur
st
oc
ks
an
d
re
po
rt
ed
in
Ta
bl
e
3.
D
ay
s
ar
e
cla
ss
iﬁ
ed
as
ev
en
t
or
no
n-
ev
en
t
da
ys
us
in
g
bo
th
1-
da
y
an
d
3-
da
y
wi
nd
ow
s
ar
ou
nd
th
e
ba
nk
in
g
se
cr
ec
y
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
.
At
th
e
5%
lev
el
st
at
ist
ica
lly
sig
ni
ﬁc
an
tt
es
ts
ta
tis
tic
sa
re
bo
ld
fa
ce
d.
30
Ba
nk
D
at
e
Ev
en
ts
A
ﬀe
ct
ed
D
es
cr
ip
tio
n
U
BS
04
/2
4/
20
02
15
#
U
BS
an
no
un
ce
s
th
at
it
w
ill
hi
re
25
0
ad
di
tio
na
lw
ea
lth
m
an
ag
er
s
in
G
er
m
an
y.
11
/0
1/
20
02
25
*
U
BS
se
lls
its
pr
iv
at
e
cl
in
ic
s
ch
ai
n
to
a
Br
iti
sh
gr
ou
p.
01
/2
0/
20
03
31
#
U
BS
to
be
pr
ob
ed
by
Sw
iss
Ba
nk
in
g
C
om
m
iss
io
n.
03
/0
6/
20
03
32
#
U
BS
an
no
un
ce
s
up
to
C
H
F5
bn
sh
ar
e
bu
yb
ac
k.
C
SG
03
/1
3/
20
01
8#
C
SG
an
no
un
ce
s
re
co
rd
ne
t
in
co
m
e
of
C
H
F
7.
2
bi
lli
on
fo
r
20
00
.
05
/2
1/
20
01
11
#
C
SG
m
an
ag
er
s
fo
re
ca
st
lo
we
r
ne
t
in
co
m
e
fo
r
th
e
se
co
nd
qu
ar
te
r.
06
/2
0/
20
02
19
#
C
SG
pr
ov
id
es
C
H
F
1.
7
bi
lli
on
of
ad
di
tio
na
le
qu
ity
to
W
in
te
rt
hu
r,
its
in
su
ra
nc
e
su
bs
id
ia
ry
.
09
/0
5/
20
02
20
#
,2
1#
C
re
di
t
Su
iss
e
Fi
rs
t
Bo
st
on
(C
SF
B)
is
as
ke
d
by
th
e
U
.S
.C
on
gr
es
s
to
pr
ov
id
e
do
cu
m
en
ts
de
ta
ili
ng
ho
w
hi
gh
-t
ec
h
co
m
pa
ni
es
we
re
ta
ke
n
pu
bl
ic
.
10
/0
8/
20
02
22
#
,2
3*
C
SF
B
la
ys
oﬀ
17
00
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
10
/2
5/
20
02
24
#
C
SG
an
no
un
ce
s
a
wa
ge
fre
ez
e
fo
r
20
03
.
10
/2
8/
20
02
24
#
To
ge
th
er
w
ith
C
iti
gr
ou
p
an
d
JP
M
or
ga
n,
C
SF
B
is
su
ed
by
En
ro
n
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
fo
r
al
le
ge
dl
y
he
lp
in
g
th
e
co
m
pa
ny
hi
de
lia
bi
lit
ie
s.
10
/3
1/
20
02
25
#
Te
n
in
ve
st
m
en
t
ba
nk
s,
in
cl
ud
in
g
C
SF
B,
ap
pe
ar
cl
os
e
to
se
tt
lin
g
ch
ar
ge
s
re
ga
rd
in
g
bi
as
ed
ra
tin
gs
on
st
oc
ks
.
11
/0
1/
20
02
25
*
C
la
ss
ac
tio
n
su
it
ﬁl
ed
ag
ai
ns
t
C
SF
B
fo
r
m
isl
ea
di
ng
an
al
ys
t
re
po
rt
s.
11
/0
4/
20
02
25
#
,2
6#
C
SF
B
an
no
un
ce
s
it
w
ill
cu
t
20
%
of
its
wo
rk
fo
rc
e.
01
/2
1/
20
03
31
#
C
SG
an
no
un
ce
s
a
re
co
rd
lo
ss
of
C
H
F
3.
4
bi
lli
on
fo
r
20
02
.
03
/0
7/
20
03
32
*
C
SF
B
su
bp
oe
na
ed
by
En
ro
n
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
co
ur
t.
06
/0
5/
20
03
34
#
U
BS
ra
ise
s
its
pr
ic
e
ta
rg
et
fo
r
C
SG
.
Ba
er
03
/1
6/
20
01
9*
Ba
er
an
no
un
ce
s
C
H
F1
00
m
sh
ar
e
bu
yb
ac
k.
06
/1
7/
20
02
18
*,
19
#
Ba
er
ru
le
s
ou
t
an
y
m
er
ge
r
de
al
w
ith
ot
he
r
ba
nk
s.
10
/3
0/
20
02
25
#
Ba
er
is
su
ed
by
cl
ie
nt
s.
12
/1
6/
20
02
29
#
Sa
lO
pp
en
he
im
do
w
ng
ra
de
s
Ba
er
to
S
el
l.
03
/1
2/
20
03
33
#
Be
ar
iss
ue
s
pr
oﬁ
t
wa
rn
in
g,
an
no
un
ce
s
th
at
as
se
ts
un
de
r
m
an
ag
em
en
t
ar
e
st
ill
fa
lli
ng
,a
nd
la
ys
-o
ﬀ
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
Vo
nt
ob
el
06
/2
0/
20
00
4*
Vo
nt
ob
el
's
pr
iv
at
e
eq
ui
ty
ar
m
re
po
rt
s
re
co
rd
pr
oﬁ
ts
of
C
H
F
13
0
m
ill
io
n
fo
r
19
99
.
03
/1
5/
20
01
9#
To
p
m
an
ag
em
en
t
is
ﬁr
ed
af
te
r
th
e
ba
nk
in
cu
rs
an
ad
di
tio
na
lC
H
F
10
0
m
ill
io
n
lo
ss
in
its
e-
ba
nk
in
g
pr
oj
ec
t.
09
/0
4/
20
02
20
*
ZK
B
do
w
ng
ra
de
s
Vo
nt
ob
el
to
S
el
l.
12
/1
3/
20
02
29
#
Vo
nt
ob
el
an
no
un
ce
s
th
e
de
pa
rt
ur
e
of
its
C
FO
,t
he
cl
os
in
g
of
its
Fr
an
kf
ur
t
oﬃ
ce
,a
nd
pu
lli
ng
ou
t
of
th
e
U
.S
.b
ro
ke
ra
ge
bu
sin
es
s.
Ta
bl
e
5:
C
on
fo
un
di
ng
Ev
en
ts
fo
r
th
e
Fo
ur
B
an
ks
.
Co
nf
ou
nd
in
g
ev
en
ts
ar
e
id
en
tiﬁ
ed
fro
m
th
e
Le
xu
s/
N
ex
us
da
ta
ba
se
an
d
ba
nk
s'
we
b
sit
es
.
Th
e
ev
en
ts
re
ta
in
ed
ar
e
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
wh
os
e
3-
da
y
wi
nd
ow
so
ve
rla
p
wi
th
th
e
3-
da
y
wi
nd
ow
ar
ou
nd
a
ba
nk
in
g
se
cr
ec
y
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ta
nd
in
vo
lv
in
g
(1
)M
&
A
tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
(b
ot
h
ac
qu
isi
tio
ns
an
d
di
ve
st
itu
re
s)
,(
2)
ch
an
ge
si
n
to
p
m
an
ag
em
en
t,
(3
)m
aj
or
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
gs
(s
uc
h
as
la
yo
ﬀs
),
(4
)l
eg
al
di
sp
ut
es
or
ac
tio
ns
ta
ke
n
by
re
gu
la
to
rs
,o
r(
5)
ea
rn
in
gs
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
.F
or
ea
ch
co
nf
ou
nd
in
g
ev
en
t,
th
ec
ol
um
n
E
ve
nt
sA
ﬀe
ct
ed
r
ep
or
ts
th
eb
an
ki
ng
se
cr
ec
y
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
wh
os
e
3-
da
y
wi
nd
ow
s
ov
er
la
p
wi
th
th
e
3-
da
y
wi
nd
ow
ar
ou
nd
th
e
co
nf
ou
nd
in
g
ev
en
t.
Ba
nk
in
g
se
cr
ec
y
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
oc
cu
rr
in
g
on
th
e
sa
m
e
da
y
as
a
co
nf
ou
nd
in
g
ev
en
ta
re
m
ar
ke
d
wi
th
an
as
te
ris
k,
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
oc
cu
rr
in
g
on
e
or
tw
o
tr
ad
in
g
da
ys
be
fo
re
or
af
te
ra
co
nf
ou
nd
in
g
ev
en
tw
ith
a
ha
sh
sig
n.
31
1-day 3-day
Event UBS CSG Baer Vontobel Average UBS CSG Baer Vontobel Average
1 −1.89 −0.29 1.97 −2.52 −0.68 −1.83 −0.83 3.55 3.90 1.20
2 −0.92 −1.29 −3.09 0.99 −1.08 1.14 1.78 −1.09 3.50 1.33
3 0.55 −0.14 −0.46 0.07 0.01 3.57 1.20 −1.68 0.17 0.82
4 −0.11 −1.47 0.24 * −0.44 −1.11 −0.34 2.81 * 0.45
5 1.85 0.92 1.42 0.22 1.10 1.97 3.65 1.36 0.66 1.91
6 −0.16 2.38 0.37 1.14 0.93 −0.76 0.07 3.52 0.39 0.80
7 1.34 0.86 −0.46 −2.47 −0.18 1.90 0.97 −1.25 −6.14 −1.13
8 −1.19 0.39 −0.94 −0.97 −0.68 −0.71 0.42# 0.25 −5.66 −1.81
9 −1.37 2.15 * −4.28 −1.17 −3.50 1.95 * 0.75# −0.97
10 2.74 1.89 −0.58 5.68 2.43 4.16 0.90 −3.66 8.34 2.43
11 1.73 1.17 −0.81 −0.44 0.41 2.61 1.64# 1.05 1.32 1.81
12 −0.93 −0.91 0.14 −3.62 −1.33 −0.93 −4.08 0.36 −0.16 −1.20
13 0.49 −0.54 0.93 2.19 0.77 1.38 −2.32 3.25 −3.00 −0.17
14 0.70 0.15 −1.39 −1.29 −0.46 1.57 3.44 −0.87 −5.30 −0.29
15 −1.05 −2.10 −1.13 0.33 −0.99 −1.92# −2.77 −2.08 −1.26 −2.09
16 1.50 2.50 2.96 1.88 2.21 −0.22 1.32 1.42 0.29 0.71
17 −0.65 −0.47 0.01 1.73 0.16 −0.05 −1.48 −0.28 1.18 −0.16
18 −0.41 −2.27 * −2.47 −1.72 1.56 −1.23 * −6.13 −1.93
19 −1.32 −3.48 −4.20 1.15 −1.96 −0.56 −3.90# −1.90# −0.48 −1.60
20 −0.37 −2.54 2.39 * −0.17 −0.82 −1.66# 3.45 * −0.03
21 0.17 1.74 −1.38 −1.63 −0.28 −0.50 2.17# −1.17 6.77 1.93
22 −5.63 −3.51 −0.47 0.88 −2.18 −11.20 −10.37# 0.06 −0.43 −5.49
23 −0.45 * 5.37 3.72 2.88 3.01 * 6.05 3.82 4.30
24 0.86 2.57 2.96 4.44 2.71 2.56 −1.36# −1.00 8.53 1.98
25 * * 2.11 1.58 1.84 * * 5.36# −0.85 1.42
26 −0.84 −8.20 −0.84 1.85 −2.01 −1.78 −6.11# −2.39 1.92 −2.36
27 0.38 −1.13 −0.31 −0.21 −0.32 −0.29 2.94 −1.25 8.00 2.35
28 0.66 2.41 −0.41 2.54 1.30 −0.35 6.27 5.27 2.70 3.47
29 0.25 0.82 1.21 −4.17 −0.47 1.71 1.81 −1.76# −5.25# −0.39
30 0.88 0.90 −3.49 1.06 −0.16 0.44 −1.01 −4.28 0.21 −1.16
31 −2.77 −3.04 −0.74 −1.14 −1.92 −2.68# −0.57# 1.61 −2.60 −0.89
32 −0.05 * −1.64 −1.72 −1.14 −0.05# * 0.05 −3.23 −1.03
33 −1.64 −4.58 −7.87 −9.38 −5.87 −1.28 −4.66 −8.69# −13.52 −7.08
34 0.70 0.47 4.00 7.56 3.19 0.15 −0.34# 7.41 14.49 6.31
Total −6.93 −14.63 −4.12 2.70 −5.26 −2.77 −12.52 13.48 12.92 3.45
t-ratio −0.90 −1.44 −0.36 0.21 −0.75 −0.21 −0.75 0.70 0.64 0.29
Table 6: Abnormal Returns Around the Individual News Announcements About
Banking Secrecy. For 1-day windows, abnormal returns are given by the coeﬃcient of dummy
variables that take the value 1 on the day of the event and 0 otherwise. For 3-day windows,
it is computed as the sum of the coeﬃcients of three dummy variables. Events for which no
abnormal return is computed for a given bank because of a confounding event occurring on the
same day as a banking secrecy announcement are marked with an asterisk, and events for which
the abnormal return is based on fewer than 3 trading days because of a confounding event with
a hash sign. At the 5% level statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns are boldfaced.
1-day 3-day
UBS CSG Baer Vontobel UBS CSG Baer Vontobel
Event Days
UBS 1 0.5702 0.2155 0.3116 1 0.5333 0.1712 0.2080
CSG 1 0.4109 0.2275 1 0.3367 0.1202
Baer 1 0.5690 1 0.3540
Vontobel 1 1
Non-Event Days
UBS 1 0.3812 0.1716 0.0977 1 0.3846 0.1722 0.0897
CSG 1 0.2678 0.1412 1 0.2670 0.1516
Baer 1 0.2086 1 0.2166
Vontobel 1 1
Diﬀerence
UBS 0 0.1890 0.0439 0.2139 0 0.1487 −0.0010 0.1182
CSG 0 0.1431 0.0862 0 0.0697 −0.0314
Baer 0 0.3604 0 0.1374
Vontobel 0 0
Table 7: Correlation Between Banks' Abnormal Returns on Event and Non-Event
Days, and Diﬀerence Between the Two. For each bank pair, the correlation on event
days is computed on the basis of days where neither of the two banks considered is aﬀected
by a confounding event. At the 5% level statistically signiﬁcant values are boldfaced. The
signiﬁcance of each correlation is assessed using the standard t-test, that of the diﬀerence in
correlation between event and non-event days using the Jennrich (1970) test.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the Four Bank Stocks.
Cumulative abnormal returns of the four bank stocks for each announcement using
1-day windows (top panel) and 3-day windows (bottom panel). Solid lines depict
the CARs considering all announcements, dashed lines CARs considering announce-
ments with statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns only, and dotted lines CARs
considering events that are statistically signiﬁcant for at least two banks for both
the 1-day and 3-day windows.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns.
Cumulative average abnormal returns of the four bank stocks for each announce-
ment using 1-day windows (top panel) and 3-day windows (bottom panel). Solid
lines depict the CARs considering all announcements, dashed lines CARs consider-
ing announcements with statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns, and dotted lines
CARs considering events that are statistically signiﬁcant for at least two banks for
both the 1-day and 3-day windows.
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